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Abstract 
Borjas  (1987,  1991  and  1994)  developed  the  self-selection  theory,  applying  Roy’s  model 
(1951) to migration studies. He establishes that the characteristics of migrants in terms of 
skills and abilities are driven by wage distribution differences between the host country and 
home. In this regard, when the country of origin has higher relative returns for skills and more 
disperse income distribution, a negative selection of migrants is generated, and vice versa. A 
great deal of literature  has studied Self-selection model to analyse how wage distribution 
influences  migrants’  decisions,  leading  to  consistent  and  inconsistent  results.  Given  the 
conflicting  results  in  the  literature,  this  paper  examines  how  migration  costs  and  wage 
differences influence self-selection patterns –i.e. skills in terms of schooling levels. Taking 
into account that self-selection can not be studied systematically by means of standard data 
sources because of the lack of data, we propose an analytical model based on the individual 
investment decision theory (Human Capital theory), applying simulated data by Monte-Carlo 
method. The theory of individual investment decisions allows us to analyze self-selection 
patterns across differences in wages and economic conditions at home and in host countries 
and to introduce uncertainty using a stochastic framework. An empirical application for long-
distant migrations –from Ecuador to Spain– is implemented. Our findings show that migrants 
are positively selected on observable skills between Spain  and Ecuador, considering both 
constant direct migration costs and constant direct migration costs-plus-variable opportunity 
migration costs. Secondary data from official sources confirm this tendency. 
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1. Introduction 
Borjas  (1987,  1991  and  1994)  developed  the  self-selection  (supply  side)  theory,  applying 
Roy’s model (1951) to migration studies. He establishes that the characteristics of migrants 
(selection) in terms of skills and abilities are driven by wage distribution differences between 
the host country and home. This affects migration in both number and the skill composition of 
migrants.  Regarding  skill  compositions,  developed  countries  have  more  equal  income 
distributions  on  average  than  developing  countries;  therefore,  Borjas  (1991)  states  that 
migrants, who come from developing countries, are subject to unfavourable bias in selection 
processes; depending on migration, costs (time-equivalent migration costs) will be constant 
among individuals.  
Nevertheless, the previous results are controversial and not conclusive according to empirical 
evidence (Brücker and Trübswetter, 2004) found with respect to Borjas’ theory. Chiswick 
(1987, 1999, 2000) argues that a greater difference in income compared to the country of 
origin only attenuates positive selection of migrants; Jasso and Rosenzweig (2008) state that 
benefits from migrating are higher for more skilled workers, given the positive skill-price 
differential of migration costs in time between home and host country; Chiquiar and Hanson 
(2005) find intermediate and positive selection of migrants from Mexico to the United States; 
Akee (2007) affirms positive selection based on educational levels and unobservable skills 
from the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) to the United States; etc. 
Given  the  conflicting  results  in  the  literature  about  migration  self-selection,  this  paper 
examines  how  migration  costs  and  wage  differences  influence  self-selection patterns  –i.e. 
skills in terms of schooling levels, although only observable abilities related to education are 
considered. We propose an empirical framework based on the individual investment decision 
theory  (Human  Capital  theory)  and  simulated  data  (Monte-Carlo  method).  This  model 
introduces uncertainty using a stochastic framework and also includes differences in wage and 
economic conditions at home and in host countries, giving a view of the economic actors’ 
decision-making processes  or  intentions.  Furthermore,  it provides  a  way  to  overcome  the 
influence of push-pull factors in existing source and host-country data, as well as non-random 
sample-selection problems due to the self-selected samples of the population who migrates.  
The study uses data from Spain and Ecuador. Spain has lower wage dispersion than Ecuador, 
and it has not got a migration policy of attracting migrants with higher studies. Furthermore, 
this country has become one of the main receiving countries in the European Union (EU). In 
2008 some 11% of its population was immigrant, the migrant stock having increased more   3 
than 1.5 points since 2002 (OECD, 2009). Ecuadorians are the most numerous long-distant 
migration cohorts. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next Section develops an extended version of the self-
selection Borjas’ model to analyse how the differences in earning distribution and the average 
wage levels affect the migrant’s skill structure. In the third Section, the data and results are 
shown. Finally, the paper ends with a review of the main conclusions and a brief discussion of 
the most relevant issues. 
 
2. Theoretical framework and the specification of the  et Present Value model 
An empirical application of a simple model is developed in the tradition of the so-called 
Human Capital approach (Sjaastad, 1962; Harris and Todaro, 1970) where expected earnings 
are conditioned by the probability of finding a job.  Migration is considered in our model as 
the result of an individual choice –i.e. an individual investment decision which leads to some 
expected incomes and costs.  
The  model  only  considers  economic  or  pecuniary  incomes  and  costs.  Nevertheless,  this 
limitation of the model is insignificant because of the aims of our research. This insight is 
applied  to  analyse  the  effects  of  migration  costs  and  wage  dispersions  on  self-selection 
tendencies, supposing, firstly, that out-of-pocket expenses are constant among migrants and, 
secondly, that opportunity costs vary according to the level of schooling. 
The  model  assumes  that  migrants  have  risk  neutrality,  so  migrants  adopt  the  decision  to 
migrate discounting expected incomes and costs at a constant interest rate r and there are no 
investments in acquisition of human capital after the migration. 
The analyses focus on concrete profiles which depend on the sex i (i= 1, male; i= 2, female); 
the age j (j= 1, from 16  to 24 years of age; j= 2, from 25 to 44; j= 3, from 45 to 65), taking 
into  consideration  that  the  potential  migrants’  ages  are  between  16  and  65  years  of  age, 
because migrations are guided by labour – and adapting Borjas’ classification (2000); and 
schooling levels  k (k= 1, primary level with less than 9 years of schooling; k= 2, secondary 
level from 9 to 11 years of schooling; k= 3, tertiary level with over 12 years of schooling). 
This classification is a modification of that used by UNESCO (1997). 
Potential migrants to a developed country face forecasted incomes and costs for a finite time 
horizon given by: 
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V is the net present value from migration in t, i.e. it is the monetary surplus that the migrants 
can  assign  to  consume,  save-invest  or  send  in  remittances  after  satisfying  their  basic  or 
primary necessities. The expected nominal wages in the country of destination for the migrant 
are  given  by  ( ) t t W f d = .  According  to  Harris  and  Todaro  (1970),  dt  represents  the 
employment rate in the host country (1-unemployment rate), being a random variable which 
represents a priori probability. In this regard, when the migrant is unemployed, the wage turns 
into a subsistence income (St) –e.g. subsidies, informal wages, etc. 
In addition, Ht is the profitability derived from savings or capital investments in the country of 
destination D; and lt represents the interest rate received from savings or capital investments. 
This profitability is estimated by means of the monetary surplus given by the differences 
between wages and habitual cost of living, and it is a function of the propensity to migrate 
(Ht=f(Rt))  where  Rt  represent  a  priori  probability.  The  propensity  to  save  or  to  invest  is 
estimated as: 1- Rt.  
Ct represents the usual living costs in the country of destination D as primary costs derived 
from basic consumption, which are also conditioned by the employment situation. CRt is the 
cost  of  sending  remittances  because  of  the  importance  in  migration  decisions  (Stark  and 
Levari, 1982; Lauby and Stark 1988; Rapoport and Docquier, 2006). This figure is calculated 
by the migrants’ monetary surplus, their propensity to send remittances (Rt) and transaction 
costs from sending remittances (qt).  
rt explains the migrants’ interest or discount rate [rtÎ(0, 1)], as the required rate of return 
because of the expected risk in the flows due to fluctuating economic conditions in their 
countries. Here, we consider that the lowest discount rate financially acceptable for migrants 
is capital opportunity cost in nominal terms. gi, fi and zi add the effects of inflation in the 
country  of  destination  D  on  wages,  costs  and  general  price  increases,  respectively.  I0 
represents the costs related to migration in t= 0 in the  broadly meaning defined by Chiswick 
(2000)  where  migration  costs  include:  direct  or  out-of-pocket  costs  (travel  costs,  T0,  and 
regularization costs, R0) as well as opportunity costs derived from travel to and reallocation in 
the new country (F0). Thus, according to Chiswick (1987 and 2000) and Borjas (1987), we 
establish an opportunity cost for time equivalent units, such that:  t kW p = p . The variable pk   5 
shows the proportion of the year dedicated to the satisfaction of migration costs which depend 










). However, the cost of the time-equivalent units for migration 
is given by the wages in the host countries which increase according to educational levels. 
Therefore,  investment  is  represented  by:  0 0 0 0 k t I p W T R F = + + + .  If  different  currencies 
between  countries  are  considered  the  exchange  rate  is  incorporated  corrected  by  Power 
Purchase Parity. 
The model allows controlling the effect of the educational level on the propensity to migrate. 
Nevertheless, the potential migrant makes his decision by comparing the potential earnings of 
migrating with those of remaining at home. The model posits that potential migrants will 
move if the expected utility of moving is higher (Funkhouser, 2009). Therefore, the expected 
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V´ is the net present value for the decision to stay at home, i. e. the value of not going through 
with the migration. The nominal wage in the country of origin,  t W¢, is calculated from the 
same point of view as the timing of migration where  ( ) t t W f d ¢ ¢ = . 
 
3. Decision making model for Migration from Ecuador to Spain 
3.1. Data 
Monte-Carlo simulation is a stochastic method to simulate output fluctuations. Input variables 
are  random  or  stochastic  ones  whose  behaviour  depends  on  their  statistical  distributions 
(Fishman,  1996).  In  the  study  of  migration  decisions,  the  application  of  the  Monte-Carlo 
simulation method is due to the lack of disaggregated data series and the inexact character of 
this data. We include uncertainty not only about the future behaviour of returns and costs 
derived from migration, but also about the returns if the option to migrate is not chosen, as 
well as about the economic situations in the countries of origin and of destination.  
The analysis involves Ecuador (as the country of origin), situated in Latin America, and Spain 
(as the host country), located in southern Europe.  
Ecuador is situated in Latin America and has more than 12 million inhabitants. Some 60% of 
Ecuadorians live in urban areas. Two million Ecuadorians have migrated in the last decade   6 
(INEC, 2010); also, a feminization process has transformed the migration flows as 50% of 
Ecuadorian migrants were women between the years 2000 and 2005 (UN, 2005). Spain is 
located in the south of Europe and has become one of the most important migration-receiving 
countries in the EU, and has lower income dispersion than Ecuador (Gini’s Index: less than 32 
in Spain compared to 50 in Ecuador). In 2008, the migrant stock in Spain for Ecuadorians 
exceeded 400,000 people of whom 91% stated that they went to Spain to look for better jobs 
(INE, 2008). 
Three migrant profiles are found in our design:  
1.  Y1, rural women between 25 and 44 years of age with primary studies (less than 9 years 
of schooling);  
2.  Y2, rural women of the same age and with secondary studies (9 – 11 years of schooling); 
3.  Y3, rural women of the same age with tertiary studies (more than 12 years of schooling). 
In the destination country, it is taken that entry wages are lower than those of native workers 
(Borjas, 2000) and wage gaps are reduced as time passes (Borjas, 2000) such that Wt=gt Wt-1. 
Depending on migrants’ contractual situations, they can stay: employment, unemployment 
and sub-employment. Also, the period of time (t) used in the models is 10 years.  
The selection of statistical distribution and ranges for each variable, presented in Table 1, are 
based on limited existing secondary data
1, and expert knowledge.   
Table1. Input of variable statistical distributions and ranges 
Y1  Y2  Y3  Variables  Statistical 
Distribution  Range  Range  Range 
T0  Triangular  [480, 840, 1200]  [480, 840, 1200]  [480, 840, 1200] 
R0  Uniform  [540, 1200]  [540, 1200]  [540, 1200] 
E0
(a)  Uniform  [0.80, 1.20]  [0.80, 1.20]  [0.80, 1.20] 
Wt
(b)  Triangular  [4500, 6800, 9000]  [6000, 7500, 12000]  [7500, 8500, 16000] 
gt  Uniform  [1, 1.007]  [1, 1.009]  [1, 1.01] 
St  Uniform  [1200, 4000]  [1200, 5000]  [1200, 6000] 
SSt
(c)  Uniform  [3000, 7000]  [3000, 8500]  [4000, 11000] 
gt  Uniform  [1, 5]  [1, 5]  [1, 5] 
ft  Uniform  [2, 7]  [2, 7]  [2, 7] 
Ct 
(d)  Triangular  [4500, 6000, 7000]  [6000, 7000, 7500]  [7000, 7500, 8000] 
CUt
(e)  Uniform  [3500, 4000]  [4000, 5000]  [4000, 6000] 
CSt
(f)  Uniform  [4000, 6500]  [4000, 7000]  [4000, 500] 
                                                 
1 Secondary data come from Eurostat, OECD, ILO, The Spanish Statistical Institute (INE) and The Ecuadorian Statistical Institute (INEC).   7 
Rt  Uniform  [0, 2000]  [0, 4000]  [0, 6000] 
qt  Uniform  [0.08, 0.20]  [0.08, 0.20]  [0.08, 0.20] 
Ht  Uniform  [0, 2000]  [0, 4000]  [0, 6000] 
li  Uniform  [0.02, 0.08]  [0.02, 0.08]  [0.02, 0.08] 
rt  Uniform  [1, 6]  [1, 6]  [1, 6] 
zi  Triangular  [1, 3, 5]  [1, 3, 5]  [1, 3, 5] 
W’t 
(g)  Triangular  [250, 1200, 3000]  [250, 1700, 5000]  [250, 2500, 8000] 
S’t  Uniform  [0, 730]  [0, 730]  [0, 730] 
S’St
(h)  Uniform  [1000, 2000]  [1000, 3000]  [1000, 4000] 
g´t  Uniform  [0, 5]  [0, 5]  [0, 5] 
f´t  Uniform  [0, 13]  [0, 13]  [0, 13] 
C’t
(i)  Triangular  [1000, 1200, 3000]  [1000, 1700, 3000]  [1000, 2500, 4000] 
C´Ut
(j)  Uniform  [1000, 1200]  [1000, 1200]  [1000, 1200] 
C´St
(k)  Uniform  [1000, 1500]  [1000, 2000]  [1000, 3500] 
r’ t  Uniform  [5, 15]  [5, 15]  [5, 15] 
z’i  Triangular  [1, 6, 11]  [1, 6, 11]  [1, 6, 11] 
a E0
 expresses the currency exchange between the dollar and euro.  
b Host wage is conditioned by dt which represents the employment rate in the host country (70%, 88%, 
92%, respectively for each profile), but we also introduce the probability of unemployment (15%, 6%, 
4%) and being sub-employed (15%, 6%, 4%). 
c SSt is earnings from illegal work or sub-employment. 
d The habitual cost of living is calculated in function of the minimum costs for a basic shopping 
basket.  
e Usual costs are linked to situations of unemployment. 
f These usual costs are linked to sub-unemployment situations. 
g Home wage is conditioned by d´t which represents the employment rate in the home country (45%, 
50%, 70% respectively for each profile), but we also introduce the probability of being unemployed 
(10%, 10%, 6%) and sub-employed (45%, 40%, 34%).  
h S’St
 is earnings from illegal work or sub-employment. 
i The habitual cost of living is calculated in function of a basic and vital shopping basket. 
j Usual costs linked to unemployment situations. 
k These usual costs are linked to sub-unemployment situations. 
 
3.2. Results 
Figures 1, 2 and 3 contain the probability of obtaining monetary surplus or losses by Y1, Y2 
and Y3 derived from migration (V) and not leaving the country of origin (V´) when migration 
costs are constant.  
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Figure 1. NPV First Profile (Y1) for constant   Figure  2.  NPV  Second  Profile  (Y2)  for 







Figure 3. NPV Third  
Profile (Y3) for  
constant migration costs 
Source: authors’ elaboration. 
 
Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the same estimation as the previous one but for variable migration 
costs (opportunity costs) across schooling levels.  
 
Figure 4. NPV First Profile (Y1) for variable   Figure 5. NPV Second Profile (Y2) for 








Figure 6. NPV Third 
Profile (Y3) for  
constant migration costs 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration. 
 
Ecuadorian rural women with a primary schooling level (Y1) have 60% or 93% of probability 
of getting a negative V –i.e. not recovering migration costs–, depending on whether constant 
or constant- plus-variable migration costs are taken into account. The income dispersion for   9 
constant costs is situated between $-27,000 and $24,000; when variable costs are included, the 
upper limit for earning is similar but the lower limit decreases to $77,000. The average loss 
goes from $1,600 to $16,000. The option not to migrate (V´) has 96% likelihood of reaching a 
negative value –i.e. the potential migrant would not be able to pay the basic shopping basket–, 
resulting in a smaller range between $ -8,500 and $3,100, with $2,108 of average loss. The 
previous results take into account the poor economic conditions in Ecuador, where some 60% 
of the rural population lives in poverty conditions with a per capita income of about $1,000 
per  year,  and  30%  undergo  extreme  poverty  conditions  (INEC,  2010).  Nevertheless,  in 
different reports the poverty reaches 95% for rural women (FAO, 2008).  
For the second profile (Y2), the probability of obtaining a negative V is lower than in the 
previous  example:  22%  (constant  costs)  and  63%  (constant-plus-variable  costs),  with  the 
higher  income  limit  at  $35,000  and  the  lower  one  at  $-24,000  or  $  -86,000.  Again,  the 
uncertainty due to variable costs increases the dispersion range by raising the lower limit; the 
average is around $5,000 income or $3,000 loss. The option of not leaving home results in 
78% likelihood of a negative V´. This percentage reflects the small wage gap between workers 
with primary and secondary studies in rural Ecuador. The simulation gives an average loss of 
$1,315.  
As potential migrants Y3 have 2% or 14% probability of obtaining a negative V, their recovery 
of migration costs, even variable costs, has 86% likelihood of occurring. The average income 
ends up being $17,000 or $9,700. The probability of obtaining losses from not leaving home 
(V´) approaches 51%. 
Based on the previous probabilities, at first glance migrants would tend to be positively self-
selected, considering both constant and constant-variable costs. Nevertheless, rural women 
with  primary  or  secondary  schooling  levels  are  practically  obliged  to  migrate  due  to  the 
negative economic conditions in their country of origin, although they have more difficulties 
recovering migration costs. In this regard, internal migrations are easier for rural women with 
primary  education.  For  the  second  group,  rural  women  with  secondary  education,  both 
internal  and  international  migration  would  be  a  good  option.  33%  of  rural  people  with 
secondary education migrate to urban areas. Furthermore, 58% of Ecuadorian migrants who 
work in Spain have secondary school levels, and only 27% have primary studies. In Ecuador, 
60% of the population has the lowest schooling level and 30.7%, secondary education.  
Rural  women  with  tertiary  education  levels  would  tend  to  migrate  as  they  have  worse 
economic conditions than in urban areas or Spain, although only 4% of rural people have 
tertiary schooling level.      10 
4. Discussions 
The research has been based on a country of destination which has lower wage dispersions 
and the results suggest that migrants are positively selected on observable skills, considering 
constant  direct  migration  costs  and  both  constant  direct  migration  costs  plus  variable 
opportunity migration costs among migrants’ schooling levels. An increase in migration costs 
–direct or time-costs– involves a greater tendency toward favourable selection, so individuals 
with higher education levels would tend to have a higher propensity to migrate. 
In the empirical application, Spain has a more equal income distribution than Ecuador. For 
long-distant migrations the model show a positive self-selection on observable skills; but also 
the precarious wages and conditions for rural people with primary an secondary education 
which would suppose the necessity to move. Descriptive statistic confirms that Ecuadorian 
migrants in Spain are middle and positive selected. 
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